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The Turing’s Test and the Zombie Arguments 
 
 
An abstract 
 
In this paper I shall try to put some implications concerning the Turing's test and the so-called 
Zombie arguments into the context of philosophy of mind. My intention is not to compose a review 
of relevant concepts, but to discuss central problems, which originate from the Turing's test - as a 
paradigm of computational theory of mind - with the arguments, which refute sustainability of this 
thesis.  
In the first section (Section I), I expose the basic computationalist presuppositions; by 
examining the premises of the Turing Test (TT) I argue that the TT, as a functionalist paradigm 
concept, underlies the computational theory of mind. I treat computationalism as a thesis that 
defines the human cognitive system as a physical, symbolic and semantic system, in such a 
manner that the description of its physical states is isomorphic with the description of its symbolic 
conditions, so that this isomorphism is semantically interpretable. In the second section (Section 
II), I discuss the Zombie arguments, and the epistemological-modal problems connected with them, 
which refute sustainability of computationalism. The proponents of the Zombie arguments build their 
attack on the computationalism on the basis of thought experiments with creatures behaviorally, 
functionally and physically indistinguishable from human beings, though these creatures do not 
have phenomenal experiences. According to the consequences of these thought experiments - if 
zombies are possible, then, the computationalism doesn't offer a satisfying explanation of 
consciousness. I compare my thesis from Section 1, with recent versions of Zombie arguments, 
which claim that computationalism fails to explain qualitative phenomenal experience. I conclude 
that despite the weaknesses of computationalism, which are made obvious by zombie-arguments, 
these arguments are not the last word when it comes to explanatory force of computationalism. 
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SECTION  I 
 
 
The imitation game 
 
In 1950. Alan Turing asked the following question which had been of a central importance to 
contemporary philosophy of mind: "Can machines think?” (Turing, A.M., 1950). Discussing this 
question, can hardly be of any interest (and it can hardly give any fertile basis) if we don't want an 
answer that sounds like a techno-fair sensationalistic attraction. The above-formulated question 
needs to be specified. To make that question epistemologically interesting and significant we have 
to make it clearer and we have to define our problem precisely. Turing had supposed that he 
couldn't rely on usual, everyday use of the terms "machine" and "thinking". Instead of redefining the 
meaning of these words, he suggested some more appropriate questions, which would express and 
emphasize the problem in more precise fashion. Thus, instead of the question "Can machines 
think?” Turing formulated another, another related question: "Can machines pass a behavioral-
functional test of intelligence?” The test should be an empirical test, which could offer strong 
evidence that machines can think. The significance of this question and its answer will be seen only 
if we expose the test itself and only if we make the sole question more self evident. Turing derived 
his test from an entertaining game named "the imitation game", in which the interrogator must guess 
the sex of the other two players, a male and a female. The game is set up in such a way so that the 
interrogator cannot make a right identification by recognizing the voice or the appearance of other 
participants in the game. They are located in another room so that they cannot answer the 
questions directly and immediately.  Let us name the participants in this game in the following way: 
a man (A), a female (B) and the interrogator (C) – (the interrogator can be either male or female). 
The sex of the participants is designated as X and Y, so, at the end of the game, the interrogator 
has to give answers such as “A is X, and B is Y" or "B is X, and A is Y".  
The answers should be written, or better, typed, so that the participants' voices would not 
give any clue to the interrogator. In an ideal arrangement, in Turing’s time, the most appropriate was 
a teleprinter by which the interrogator would communicate with A and with B. However, a mediator 
could repeat the questions and the answers instead. 
One of the participants can assist the interrogator by giving the true answers, while the other 
participant can perplex the interrogator by pretending that he-she is of the opposite sex. The role of 
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the participant B is to assist the interrogator. Her strategy is to give only true answers; she can even 
add different statements to her answers, like: "I am a female, don't listen to him!” However, she will 
not be of a significant help if a man, too, can give similar answers. (Turing, A.M. 1950.). 
Turing suggested to put a machine in the place of one participant and let them, basically, 
play the same game. If the interrogator cannot make a difference between a machine and a human 
being, then we can take that as strong evidence that machines can think.  
 
 
The imitation game with the machines 
 
Turing thought that the machines involved in this game should be of a very special kind. They 
should be discrete state machines - the transformations of their internal states should be finite and 
sudden; they should have an infinite memory, so operations could be performed in a reasonable 
time, and they should be universal, so any machine with such descriptions can be involved in a test. 
Turing named these machines digital computers. Every one of these conditions is the key one for 
the thesis about the implicit computational assumption in the TT.  
 
Digital computers have three basic parts: 
- a storage (a memory) 
- an executive unit (a processor, a processing unit, an executing of operations) 
- a control unit. 
Information - rules, according to which operations are performed and executed, are stored in the 
memory. 
The executive unit performs different individual operations, which are included in computations. 
These individual operations may vary in individual machines.  The operations may be like the 
following one:   "Multiply 3540675445 with 7076345687", but, in some machines, they can be very 
simple, for example "Write 0". (Turing, A.M., 1950.). 
"The Book of the rules" is in the storage.  In this case, its name is "table with instructions". Its 
role is to control whether these instructions are performed correctly and in the right order. The 
control is set up in such a manner that it operates automatically. It means that it controls every 
operation, simultaneously with its performing. 
Information in the storage are usually divided into small packets, which means that in a single 
machine a packet can contain ten decimal numbers. These numbers designate parts of the storage 
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in which different packets of information are put in some systematical way. A typical instruction can 
look like this: 
"Add a number, stored in a position 6809 to the number stored in a position 4302 and put the 
result on a next position in the storage."(Turing, A.M., 1950.). It is needless to say that the 
instruction will not appear in the machine on English or any other natural language. The instruction 
would, more probably, be 6809430217. In this case, number "17" tells which of the different possible 
operations will be performed on these two numbers.  In our case, the described operation is - "add 
number…” The control will, normally, start to perform instructions according to the sequence of 
positions on which instructions are stored, but, sometimes, an instruction such as “Now perform an 
instruction which is stored on a position 5606, and keep performing from that position" can be 
redirected. Or, as in this one: "If a position 4505 contains 0 perform next instruction, stored on 6707, 
otherwise keep performing on" (Turing, A.M. 1950.). 
The instructions of this type are very important; they enable the repetition of sequences of 
operations on and on, until new instruction appears. We can illustrate this principle by an example 
from an everyday life. Tomas’s mother wants Tomas to visit a shoemaker on his way to school, in 
order to check out whether her shoes have been repaired; to make him do so, she can either 
remind him of his task  every day, or, she can attach a note with a reminder in a hallway, which  
Tomas sees before he leaves to school. When the shoes are finally repaired and Tomas brings 
them home, he can then destroy the message. The message in the hallway stands for the book of 
the rules. On the basis of the book of the rules it is possible to integrate a random element into the 
operating of a digital computer - it enables the digital computer to reject or destroy instructions. 
Even today computers are operating according to this simple principle.  
Since we have described the physical structure of the machines, we can, now, begin with the 
exposition of the principles upon which these machines are functioning. One of the central 
conditions of operating is discrete states. They are immeasurably important, because, they enable 
one to perceive the descriptions of physical and symbolical states as identical. It also exposes the 
computational thesis, which underlies TT, in an obvious way.  
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Discrete states 
 
We can describe digital computers as discrete states machines. These machines go from 
one state into another in sudden jumps. These states are different enough to avoid and ignore a 
possibility of confusion. An example of a system with discrete states is a light-switch. Every switch 
has to be either turned on or turned off. In his 1936 paper Turing (Turing, A.M., 1936.) gave a 
description of such machine.  As an example of a discrete state machine, we can take a following 
system: imagine there's a ribbon on which certain symbols are printed, on a certain distance; above 
that ribbon there is a head, with a reader, and that head is moving above the ribbon and "reads" the 
symbols. The reader marks momentary position on the tape; it "reads" the symbols under, and it is 
one of the finite states of the machine.  In every step in which the head with the reader is moving, 
the machine is reading the symbol, which lies on a momentary position on the ribbon. For every 
combination of the momentary states and the read symbols, this mechanism determines a new 
internal state, which can be one of these: writing symbols on the ribbon; directing of the head with 
the reader moves (left or right) or stopping the head. In specific case, the machine writes the symbol 
on the ribbon and moves one - step in the right. This procedure can be set up in such manner so 
the state in which the symbol is writing follows the state of moving of the head. Therefore, this 
machine has three discrete states and they are: 1) the state of writing the symbol on the ribbon, 2) 
the state of moving towards a next symbol, 3) the state of being still. A set of symbols on the ribbon 
consists only of "0" and "1" and the machine is set up in such a way so it begins from the outermost 
left symbol on the ribbon.  (Turing, A.M., 1936.). 
This machine can formally be described in these terms: the internal state of the machine 
(described by a position of the reader in relation to the symbol on the ribbon) can be q1, q2 or q3; 
an input signal can be i0 or i1 (a position in which the head reads the symbol. Internal state is, in 
every moment, determined by the last state and the input signal, as shown in this table: 
 
Internal state       q1...q2.. .q3 
i0(last state)     q2...q3...q1 
Input (reading the symbol) 
i1(following state)      q1...q2...q3 
 
 
 7 
The output signals, the only visible indicators of internal states (for example, the symbols 
written by the head on the out coming ribbon, which we can read), can be described in next table: 
 
The state     q1…q2…q3 
The output 0o…0o…01 (Turing, A. M., 1950.). 
 
This is a typical example of the discrete-state machines. They can be described with such 
tables; these tables show that these machines can only have finite number of possible states. 
On the ground of the beginning state of the machine and the input signals it is always 
possible to predict every following states; on the basis of information about the input we can know 
every forthcoming state (output).  
The description of these machines is very important, because it allow us to perceive them as 
physical, symbolical systems which can be described on physical, symbolical and semantic level in 
such a manner that their symbolical states are instantiated by their physical states and their 
symbolical states are semantically interpretable. Firstly, since it is a physical system, then there 
must be an adequate description of its states and their changes in a physical vocabulary. Thus, in 
principle, according to the physical laws we can predict their changes. In addition, the physical 
states (at least some of them) instantiate some constellations of symbols. The changes of these 
states are describable as formal or syntactic operations (computations) on the constellations of 
symbols. And, in the third place, the syntactic relations of symbolic states are isomorphic with 
semantic relations between propositions in a given language, and in that case, symbolic states are 
interpretable as a processing of semantic properties of the propositions of that language. So, the 
changes of the symbolic states in the system can be described in the terms of the semantic 
relations between interpreted propositions, i.e. the system can be described as if it makes 
conclusions, decisions, finds adequate moves in chess etc. (Buller, D.1993.). The physical 
description would consists of the positions of the head with the reader on the ribbon, the symbolic 
description would consists of the symbols on the ribbon and the logico-mathematical operations 
which they represent, while the semantic descriptions would consist of linguistic interpretations of 
output symbols. This interpretation of the discrete machines can be understood as the explicitly 
exposed computational thesis (Buller, D.J. 1993.). In the next section of this paper, I shall say 
something about other conditions and features of these machines which make them competent for 
the imitation game. 
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The Turing machine 
 
Most digital computers have finite capacity storage. There is no theoretical difficulty in 
conceiving a computer with, potentially, infinite storage capacity. In the above-described example, it 
would be a machine, supplied with a ribbon of infinite length. Naturally, in a single operation only 
one single finite part of the ribbon can be used. So, only one, finitely big storage can be 
constructed, but we can conceive that it is possible to add more of them, if necessary. Such 
imaginary computers satisfy the condition of universality. This special feature of digital computers - 
so they can emulate any discrete-state machine – is extremely important, when we consider them 
as an universal machines. The existence of the machines with such features has a very important 
consequence: it is unnecessary to construct different new machines, which would perform different 
computing processes. All of these processes can be performed by only one single computer, 
adequately programmed for every single case. It can be said that it means that all digital computers 
are equivalent. Importance of this feature is immeasurably for the thesis of isomorphism of the 
description of the physical and the symbolical states, because, even a meat-chopping machine is an 
example of the machines with discrete states (a wheel is either turning or not turning), and it works 
on the input-output principle, but it is not of any interest - because it does not operate with symbols, 
but with meat. 
This thesis enables every machine, which can be described in such a way, to enter the test. 
We will call these machines the computers of infinite capacity (Turing, A. M. 1936) or Turing 
machines. 
On the ground of a specifically detailed description of the digital computers, which is 
adequate for defined features of the machines of discrete states, we can assert that the digital 
computer of adequate speed can imitate any discrete state machine. The imitation game can be 
played with these machines and the interrogator will not be able to make a difference between 
machines and human beings. 
We can, now, consider the question from the beginning of this paper. It has been suggested 
to alter the question "Can machines think?" with another, more specific:” Is there a computer whose 
behavioral-functional performance in the imitation game interrogator could not be able to distinguish 
from human being?” We can make this question more general - "Are there such discrete-state 
machines which could fulfill these conditions?” In the context of feature of universality, we saw that 
both of these questions are equivalent to the next one - "Let's take a digital computer C. Is it true 
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that, by modifying this computer, so it has an adequate storage capacity, which increases its speed, 
and makes all of it possible by an adequate program, C can be constructed in such a way so that it 
can play a role A in the imitation game while role B would be played by a human being?"   
Turing's answer to this question is affirmative. He has even exposed a few of possible 
objections to this thesis, saying that these objections consider only a possibility of construction of 
such machines and not on a significance of the test itself. The problems which come out of the 
Turing test are, mostly, traditional epistemological problems and they should give a sort of heuristic 
principle for solving of these problems. The key assumption which is the foundation of the whole 
test is the thesis of computationalism, as I have explained it in the section on discrete states. 
The computational thesis is, actually, an explanatory model which should solve two central 
epistemological problems, which lye in the test itself. The first one is the problem of other minds. 
The problem is: the system is passing the test only if an observer thinks that he has certain mental 
states; but, the interrogator can acknowledge that only if he becomes the examined machine. How 
to avoid agnosticism and solipsism when we are faced with this problem? The second problem is a 
syntactic/semantic one and it opens a few more questions. Is syntax sufficient for the semantics? 
What is the understanding of the meaning? How can we build a system of manipulations with 
symbols, which would make semantics possible? 
  
 
Turing test and computationalism 
 
Central point of the Turing's test, which grounds the fields of AI and computationalism, says 
that we can use machines as an explanatory model for consciousness, only when the test shows 
that it is a successful heuristic principle.  The test and the machines included, do not give any model 
of consciousness or intelligence on their own. Only when they pass as the heuristic principle we can 
use them as experimental and explanatory models and only on these ground we can build a "hard" 
science, i.e. the science whose theories are empirically verifiable. This is the central argument of 
the computationalism. It is also a central problem, as we will see in the part on the zombie 
argument.  
Beside the problem and its consequences, with which we are faced by the TT, and which 
have been exposed above, TT lies on an implicit computational assumption both as the heuristic 
principle and as a central problem of AI (Block, N.1986., Chalmers, D. 1993. b).  
The scenario of the Turing test has been set up as a behavioral-functional test. Nevertheless, 
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on the ground of detailed description of the test and the machines involved in it, we discover a 
significant implicit thesis. It is the computational thesis. Let's ask ourselves, now, in which particular 
aspects the exposing of the TT is, actually, the exposing of the computational thesis. In the first 
place, we have to mark key points in the computational theory of mind.  
The basic computational thesis is the one which claims that the human cognitive system is a 
symbolical physical system (Buller, D.1993.). This definition consists of three levels. Firstly, as a 
physical system it must have an adequate description of its states and their transitions in the 
vocabulary of physics so, on the ground of physical laws we can predict their changes. Secondly, it 
is such a system in which its physical states instances certain constellations of symbols and the 
changes of these states are describable as formal or syntactic operations (computations) on these 
constellations of symbols. The third  - in this system, when syntactic relations of their symbolical 
states are isomorphic with semantic relations between propositions  of a certain language, then, 
these symbolical states are interpretable as a processing  of semantic properties, as in the case 
with the propositions in that language. So, the changes  of their symbolical states in the system can 
be described in the terms of semantic relations between interpreted sentences, i.e. the system can 
be described as if he makes conclusions, decisions, as if it makes optimal moves in chess. (Buller, 
D.1993.). 
We can derive the epistemological importance of the computational thesis from this 
description. According to Chalmers, it can be expressed in two basic theses (Chalmers, D.1993.b). 
The first one is the thesis of computational sufficiency, by which it is claimed that the right kind of 
computational structure is sufficient for consciousness - and for capturing very different mental 
states. The second is the thesis concerning computational explanation. It claims that the 
computational model of consciousness gives a general frame for the explanation of cognitive 
processes and behaviors. Can we apply these theses on TT? We certainly can. What is estimated 
in the test is a specific form of behavior. We can understand this better if we take a look at the 
description of the test. Turing claims that machines involved in the test should have certain physical 
structure. The physical structure should enable a certain kind of manipulation with symbols; this 
manipulation is syntactic, in such a way that it is semantically interpretable. The semantic 
interpretation of the manipulation with the symbols and the physical states of the machine is, 
according to Turing, isomorphic. Isomorphism of the semantic interpretation is grounded on a fact 
that the machines are, actually, the systems with discrete states, so, on the bases of input (no 
matter if we perceive it as symbolic or as a constellation of physical states) we can predict an 
output. This conclusion goes far over behaviorist interpretation of TT, because it enables us to 
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explain un-observable internal states. The computationalism is convincing because it is a model of 
explanation and not a descriptive model. The consequence of such conception is that the 
constructing of machines which would fulfill all conditions would refute or confirm computational 
theory, and, it, further, means that we could set the whole field of philosophy of mind and the 
theories of consciousness as empirical disciplines. 
In the next section, we will see to what extent is this optimism justified, especially if we 
expose the most problematic question in every theory of mind to a critical attack - an explanation of 
qualitative, phenomenal consciousness. 
 
 
 
SECTION II 
 
 
Zombies against computationalism 
 
The proponents of the Zombie arguments claim that, if zombies are possible, then 
materialism, generally taken, fails.  In attempting to refute materialism, especially functionalism and 
computationalism, they gave several thought experiments and arguments. There are many versions 
of this thought experiments, but we will deal only with zombie arguments as the most developed 
variant. Zombies have been conceived as anatomically - physiologically, and behavioral- functional 
identical with human beings, with the only difference that they don’t have consciousness. Namely, if 
there are creatures that are anatomically -physiologically - behaviorally identical with us, lacking 
only consciousness, then, their possible existence is a counterexample to the materialistic thesis 
that all mental properties (consciousness) are explainable in the physics vocabulary.  
 In this section we will see in which manner these arguments should make this special variant 
of materialism, computational functionalism, weak. The efficiency of this argument is based on a 
fact that materialism (e.g. Physicalism) claims that there isn't anything over and above the totality of 
basic physical facts. If we consider this thesis in the light of computational conceptions, we will see 
that it can be redefined in terms of the following one: there isn't anything over and above cognitive 
functions, which can be described physically or as symbolic operations. This assertion allows us to 
interpret computationalism as a non-essentialist thesis about supervenience of mental properties:  
phenomenal mental states supervene on the basic physical and symbolical states. If we accept this 
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thesis as a true one, then the possibility of the zombies reveals an opposite example to the thesis of 
the supervenience of mental states. The general structure of zombie argument goes as follows: 
 
a) If zombies are possible then the computationalism fails; 
b) Zombies are possible; 
c) So, the computationalism fails (Marton, P. 1988.). 
 
Let's take a closer look into this argument. 
 
Functionalists (computationists) claim that: 
a) All facts about (phenomenal) consciousness logically supervene on the totality of basic (micro) 
physical facts and symbolical operations which they instantiate; 
b) The proponents of zombie arguments claim that zombies, physically and behaviorally 
indistinguishable from human beings, although without mind, are logically possible.  
c) They defend this thesis by relying on a modal principle that conceivability is sufficient for 
possibility; 
d) so, if zombies are possible, then there are facts which do not supervene on the basic physical 
facts and symbolical operations which they instantiate, so, the basic functionalist (computational) 
thesis about supervenience is inconsistent (Marton, P, 1998.). 
This conclusion corresponds with everyday thinking; if in a zombie world everything is 
identical with the actual one, how can our identical duplicates can be different from us only in 
lacking consciousness? Furthermore, it means that we have to reject our thesis of the 
supervenience of the facts of higher level on the basic, physical facts, because a thought 
experiment reveals that there are some facts of higher level which may not supervene on the basic 
facts. 
So, if we accept the modal principle that the hypothesis is conceivable if and only if it does 
not contain any explicit contradiction, then we have no reasons not to accept modal conclusions in 
zombie arguments. But, can we, without any difficulty, accept this modal principle? Before we try to 
answer this question, we should remember that our thought experiment demands something more 
then logical condition of non-contradiction. In the scenario of the experiment there was another 
condition saying that zombies should not only be behavioral-functionally and physically identical 
with us, but, also, that they should keep all causal relations. What is that we are looking for, that 
exceeds the logical condition of non-contradiction? It is a causal role of consciousness, which we 
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want to implement into the thought experiment. 
But, in all thought experiments with zombies, we suppose that phenomenal experience has a 
causal role. Maybe we should suppose the opposite - that phenomenal experience has no causal 
role. In this case our argument would turn out to be reductio ad absurdum. If we leave this argument 
without this change, there is a dangerous possibility for falling into vicious circularity. Maybe we can 
avoid this circulus vitiosus if we justify our assumption about causal role of phenomenal experience 
in thought experiment with the zombies. Can we do that? Philosophers who are inclined to zombie 
arguments would, probably, claim that we can. But, in which way? 
They see a solution in a fact that this assumption needs not to be justified if we rely on a 
principle, which says that conceivability entails possibility. If one, on the ground of this principle, 
proves that zombies are possible, then the argument against computationalism is valid.  
Most philosophers, who propose zombie arguments, think that conceivability is sufficient for 
possibility, i.e. they use notions of conceivability and possibility as if they are synonyms. Even those 
philosophers who make difference between special types of logical non-contradiction in this 
principle accept the thesis that the conceivability is sufficient for possibility (Polger, T. 2000.). 
In discussions on epistemology of modal logic, opinions related to principle of conceivability, 
which is sufficient for possibility, are divided. As Sören Häggqvist write, many people will say that  it 
is unconceivable that a cube will pass through a hole in the other smaller cube; or, that one can put 
a half spoon of a sugar in almost full glass of water without spilling the water out of the glass 
(Häggqvist, S, 1996, pp.127-8). Nevertheless, as we saw that sometimes, it is possible in magic 
tricks, though it is regarded as inconceivable. 
On the other side, some things are not just possible, but even real, although they are not 
conceivable, i.e. they are possible with no regards to conceivability. If we consider these assertions 
in the light of results in neuro-science investigations on pain, we shall see how the habit to rely 
exclusively on conceivability is unjustified. Before we expose certain examples which are crucial for 
the relation between conceivability and possibility, I shall give a few introductory explanations on 
these explorations, so the application of these examples would be clearer. 
Neuro - scientific researches on pain, in second part of the 20th century, revealed that pain, 
on the most general level, has two components: sensor and affective. Sensor aspect of the pain is 
related to neurophysiologic structures and mechanisms of our body, and these structures and 
mechanisms are agents of different kinds of painful sensations. The affective aspect is represented 
by qualitative mental states, which seems to be in a correlation with sensor structures and 
mechanisms (Grahek, N. 1993.). We said that these two aspects "seem" to be in the correlation, 
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because, it seems that in all "normal" cases physiological state of pain is followed by a certain 
unpleasant mental state. What makes this problem philosophically interesting is the question of a 
causal role of painful sensations in our phenomenal experience. 
N. Grahek (Grahek, N., 2001.) gave a special interpretation of different cases of neurological 
disturbances, which throws a completely new light on the problem of conceivability / possibility. He 
emphasizes that sensory and affective components of the pain are deeply connected in “normal” 
circumstances. This connection is compatible with our modal intuitions. The most of us will think that 
painful sensations in every conceivable world should be followed with mental states, colored with 
unpleasantness. However, when we consider severe cases of cingulotomy and prefrontal 
lobotomy1, on one hand, and cases of congenital analgesia2, on the other hand, and, then, the 
basics of our modal intuitions become questionable as we shall se in the following paragraph. 
How can we understand reports on patients in unbearable physical pain, but, which, after a 
neuro-surgical operation (cingulotomy or prefrontal lobotomy) still feel the same pain, but it doesn’t 
worry them anymore, it doesn’t terrify them? Does that mean that phenomenal experience of the 
pain has been removed by the neuro-surgical intervention? On the other hand, the cases of 
congenital analgesia and asimboly3 suggest a similar conclusion. We are in front of the traditional 
philosophical problem of causality. In these cases, we should be very careful; let’s recall different 
examples from the history of science in which, on the ground of physical data, it was built a 
completely wrong causal chain. For example, an air-pressure and “horror ex vacuo”. Grahek 
suggests that, when it comes to cases like these, the phenomenal experience still exists, though it is 
different than ours. 
Among philosophers, there is a usual opinion that painful sensations are always followed by 
unpleasant phenomenal experiences and that it isn’t neither conceivable nor possible for them to 
appear without one of them. The result of pain researches reveals that it doesn’t have to be the 
case. The consequences of these researches should not lead us to a conclusion that the 
unpleasant phenomenal experiences are separable from painful sensations; but, they are, only, 
different. This is enough to show that even what we thought was inconceivable, is actually possible, 
even more – it is real, and that the principle of conceivability/possibility is not the last standpoint in 
the dispute between computationists and the proponents of zombie argument.  
Even if we solve the problems sketched above, still there is a question about intersubjective 
agreement inside this principle. How to react in a case when someone claims that what we consider 
easily conceivable isn’t conceivable at all.  As long as we stick to the first person perspective 
principle (and we don’t see a way to escape that principle) this dispute will remain open.  Until these 
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disputes are solved, it seems that conceivability is not a key for constructing of thought experiments 
(Häggqvist, S. 1996, pp128.). 
 
 
Computationalism and zombie arguments 
 in a new light 
 
Strictly speaking, the proponents of zombie arguments, i.e. the philosophers which believe 
that qualitative, phenomenal experiences are intrinsic properties of consciousness, ground their 
attack on computationalism on assumption which says that explanation of mind, based on the input, 
output and internal physical-symbolical states analysis does not give satisfying theoretical directions 
in the case of the explanation of consciousness. They build this assertion on the fact that the 
existence of zombies would not make any difference towards the computational theory of mind. On 
the other hand, the computationalists think that cognitive and computational functions are 
connected with the consciousness contingently. They think that the connection between input and 
behavior is more formal then causal (Moody, T.C.1994.) or they think that the causal relation can be 
reduced to formal.  In the light of everything said in this paper, it seems that zombies are possible 
as long as the connection between observable states of any kind and mind is contingent (Moody, 
T.C., 1994.). This, actually, means that we can consider zombie-problem as an alternative 
formulation of other minds problem. More precisely, if zombies are possible, then, the computational 
criterion for attribution of consciousness stands as unsolvable problem of other minds. 
The proponents of zombie arguments argue that computationalism is, actually, inessentialist 
theory of mind (Moody, T.C., 1994.). In light of this remark, according to computationalism, any 
given behavior can appear without the consciousness as a causal agent of that behavior. The only 
reason why would one suppose that for the explanation of certain behavior it is necessary to apply 
to the consciousness is that it seems like the given behavior demands a certain mental activity. If, 
according to computationalism, not any single explanation of mental activities demands assumption 
of the mind, so, it is not demanded for the explanation of behavior (Moody, T.C., 1994.). So, if the 
computational theory of mind is true, then zombies are possible. What are the consequences of this 
conception? This question puts us back to what we said in a section above. The existence of 
zombies would erase a difference between conscious and unconscious behavior; it would make 
computational thesis of sufficiency of cognitive - symbolical operations for explanation of mind 
insufficient 4. This, actually, means that if computationalism is true, then we don’t have any valid 
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criterion for difference between conscious human beings and zombies, so if zombies are possible, 
then, computationalism doesn’t explain the consciousness. 
But, if we put it in other way, the existence of zombies would, actually, be the strongest 
reason to accept computationalism, because, if we don‘t have any other criterion by which we could 
separate and differ conscious beings of zombies, then, the computationalism will be as close as we 
can ever get to explaining the consciousness. 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
 
 
Notes 
 
 
1) Neuro-surgery operations with cutting of certain neural connections in brain (Grahek, N. 
2002). 
2) Native insensitiveness on pain (Grahek, N. 2002). 
3) Lack of “normal” symbolic interpretation on painful sensations (Grahek, N. 2002). 
4) See chapter “Turing test and computationalism”.  
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